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Introduction
In June 2003, a United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) tribunal, constituted under the auspices of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration, rendered a procedural order that has since entered
the number of international decisions to be studied in a modern international law course.1 This was not the only decision in the broader dispute
between Ireland and the United Kingdom concerning the operation of the
nuclear reprocessing plant in Sellafield (in fact, the dispute yielded a grand
total of six); nor was it the one that settled it.2 Rather, its importance lies
in the way the tribunal— one of illustrious composition— decided to manage a potential conflict with other international jurisdictions. Faced with
the prospect of an almost certain involvement of the European Court of
Justice, the tribunal opted to suspend its proceedings.3
Let us keep the tape rolling as we fast-forward a decade. In 2013, an
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) arbitral
tribunal observed that, while the tribunal was not bound in principle by
any rule of precedent, “it should have regard to earlier decisions of courts
(particularly the International Court of Justice (ICJ)) and of other international dispute tribunals engaged in the interpretation of the terms of a
[Bilateral Investment Treaty].”4 And the next year, another example: faced
with the problem of parallel proceedings on the same dispute pending
before the domestic courts of the respondent state, an investment tribunal
observed that it had “a measure of discretion with respect to the timing and
conduct of the arbitration and that municipal judicial proceedings may
sometimes need to be taken into account.”5
What the cases (and the list could be extended quite at length) have in
common is not the originating regime, the factual matrix at issue, or the
legal problem in question, but rather the reliance on a specific, if multifaceted, principle: comity. Most legal systems look at the word with some
suspicion because there seems to be no end to the debate on its meaning.6
In the field of international law, the problem is even greater, as to talk of a
principle of “comity” is to talk of a principle that does not satisfy the legality threshold.7 Yet, this is a concept that can lay claim to a long history,
and stubbornly refuses to go away: with some generalizations, the traditional definition of comity may be that of a principle in the name of which
courts would fine-tune the reach of their national substantive law and jurisdictional rules, refrain from questioning the lawfulness of another sover1. See generally MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), (Order No. 3) (Perm. Ct. Arb. June 24,
2003) [hereinafter MOX Plant Case].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Tulip Real Est. Inv. & Dev. Netherlands v. Turkey ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28,
Decision on Bifurcated Jurisdictional Issue, para. 45 (Mar. 5, 2013).
5. Brit. Caribbean Bank Ltd. v. Gov’t Belize (Turks & Caicos Is. v. Belize), para. 187
(Perm. Ct. Arb. Dec. 19, 2014).
6. See Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3– 4 (1991).
7. JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 23– 24
(8th ed. 2012).
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eign state’s acts, and restrict themselves from issuing such judgments and
orders when to do so would amount to an unjustifiable interference.
Whatever one thinks of it, comity is widely referred to in the case law of
domestic courts.8 And of more immediate relevance for our purposes,
there are indications that it may be resurfacing in the context of international adjudication.9 While it was never really a stranger in their chambers, its recent rediscovery by international courts and tribunals can be
better explained against the background of the proliferation of judicial and
arbitral institutions and the interactions deriving therefrom.
International law, to go along with an oft-cited decision, “lacks a centralised structure,” and “does not provide for an integrated judicial system
operating an orderly division of labour among a number of tribunals.”10
Given the number and diversity of international judicial bodies, it is hardly
surprising that those who adopted expressions such as “the international
judiciary” only did so at the price of far-reaching caveats or inverted commas.11 Jurisdictional competition need not necessarily be considered disadvantageous, but it inevitably brings to the table the possibility of parallel
proceedings, diverging interpretations of the same rule, instances of forum
shopping, as well as the risk of conflicting decisions.12 Conflicts of legal
regimes probably cannot be dealt with in a fashion that is entirely satisfactory with the currently available rules. Doubts in fact remain as to whether
any rules at all could succeed in the task. For this reason, comity, which is
a creature subtler than rules, may well appear as a readily available cure for
some of these systemic problems.13
The question we want to address, then, is this: what exactly is the place of
comity in modern public international law adjudication? To do so, the
present study moves in three parts: Part I deals with the concept of comity
in private and public international law, briefly considering its development and its modern understanding. In Part II, we shift our focus to international dispute settlement and seek to identify the problems for which the
use of comity has been proposed and we engage with the current scholarly
debate on the matter. In Part III we discuss all the publicly available decisions by international courts and tribunals using the term comity and clas8. Paul, supra note 6, at 2.
9. See generally MOX Plant Case, supra note 1.
10. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT– 94– 1– I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, P 11 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 2,
1995). See also J. Pauwelyn & L.E. Salles, Forum Shopping Before International Tribunals:
(Real) Concerns, (Im)Possible Solutions, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 77, 84 (2009).
11. See Chester Brown, The Evolution and Application of Rules Concerning Independence of the International Judiciary, 2 LAW & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 63, 64 (2003);
Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the
Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. & POL. 709, 752 (1999).
12. See CHESTER BROWN, A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 33– 34
(Philippe Sands et al. eds., 2007); see also YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 73– 74 (Philippe Sands et al. eds., 2003).
13. Yuval Shany, Similarity in the Eye of the Beholder: Revisiting the Application of
Rules Governing Jurisdictional Conflicts in the Lauder/CME Cases, in CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2007 136
(Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2008).
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sify them before finally pulling the threads together.14
I.

The Concept of Comity

A celebrated international law textbook quipped that comity is “a wonderful word to use when one wants to blur the distinction between public
and private international law, or to avoid clarity of thought.”15 There are
two pieces of conventional wisdom here. The first is that, indeed, private
and public international lawyers, with some remarkable exceptions, seem
to agree that the concept of comity is not to be understood as terribly helpful. We will try, throughout this Article, to show that the helpfulness of
comity may well depend on how well we understand it. The second is that
private and public international law understandings of comity need to be
distinguished. In attempts to investigate what comity means, it is indeed
problematic to dispense with this distinction. It leads us, for instance, to
try to find a common denominator for comity in private and in public
international law. This common denominator, according to Cheatham, is
the idea that “the relation or the action in question is governed by considerations other than compulsion or legal duty.”16 Not much understanding is
gained this way. Along the same line of thought, if we focus on the etymological origins of the word, we end up in a similar place. Consider: the
word comity derives from the Latin noun comitas, meaning “courtesy,”
“friendliness,” and “civility,” but also “humanity.”17 In the English language, the term indicates courtesy and considerate behaviour towards
others,18 or “a loose widespread community based on common social
institutions.”19
In this Part, then, we will examine what comity means in public and in
private international law separately. This does mean, however, that the
concept in one field cannot be conveniently used in the other, as we will
argue throughout this Article. Before we do this, however, we should recall
that it is not too hard to find cases where comity was employed as short14. This covers all decisions issued by dispute settlement mechanisms in disputes
with at least one state party where there is some discussion of what comity is. Accordingly, we have included cases where mentions of the principle were meaningful, albeit
brief, and excluded decisions which, while containing the word “comity, clearly and
unambiguously addressed entirely different issues. Consideration was also given to the
issue of “false positives”: this is the case, for example, of expressions such as “the comity
of the majority” and citations of excerpts from other judgments lacking further discussion, but also of decisions referring to unrelated concepts such as “positive comity.” See
Agreement on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of Their
Competition Laws, June 3– 4, 1998, U.S.-E.C., art. III.
15. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 73
(2002).
16. Elliott E. Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility,
HARV. L. REV. 361, 374 (1945).
17. Comitas, A LATIN DICTIONARY FOR SCHOOLS (1879); Comitas DIZIONARIO–
ITALIANO– LATINO.
18. Definition of “comity,” OXFORD DICTIONARIES ONLINE, http://www.oxforddictionar
ies.com/definition/english/comity [https://perma.cc/HBL6-8N3M].
19. Comity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).
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hand for public international law or the entire field of conflict of law. But
it is for a more specific meaning that we are looking.
A.

Comity and Public International Law

In traditional public international law scholarship, the term comity traditionally designates, first and foremost, those acts performed— by states and
towards states only— for reasons other than the belief that there is a binding legal norm mandating them.20 Accordingly, it is customary to focus on
them to explain what international law is not.21
The non-bindingness of the rules of international comity is clearly not
disputed, but to conclude that they have no normative value whatsoever
would be a non sequitur.22 Bindingness and normativity are two different
things.23 As Hedley Bull pointed out, “order in social life is very closely
connected with the conformity of human behaviour to [normative] rules of
conduct, if not necessarily to [binding] rules of law.”24 This is surely the
case of rules of comity, which too arise from repetition of conduct— conduct which, however, is carried out in the belief that is not mandated by a
rule of international law.25 In the real world, rules of comity are routinely
complied with.26 This may result, as Hersch Lauterpacht put it, in a rule of
comity “acquiring the complexion” of rules of customary international
law.27 In other words, comity is not a source of international law, but it
may be, and has been, the basis and justification for the emergence of rules
of international law.28 Questions of immunity, for instance, largely fall
into this category.29 Where comity constitutes the basis of a rule of inter20. Paul supra note 6, at 79.
21. CRAWFORD, supra note 7, at 23– 24; LASSA OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1, 51 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 2008); MALCOLM N. SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (7th ed. 2014); Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law, in
91 MALCOLM D. EVANS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 99 (2014).
22. Gerald J. Postema, Custom in International Law: A Normative Practice Account, in
THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW, 285 (Amanda Perreau– Saussine & James Bernard Murphy eds., 2007).
23. HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 6
(2002).
24. Id.
25. For a helpful discussion of comity and custom see Postema, supra note 22, at
285.
26. Id.
27. 1 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 43– 44 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed., 1970); CRAWFORD, supra note 7, at
24. It should be pointed out that the reverse may also occur, so that rules of international law may lose their legal nature and be demoted to rules of comity. One usual
example is the practice of greeting foreign warships. Jörn Kämmerer, COMITY, MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW § 7 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2006).
28. 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, PEACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 25 (1905) (“But there
can be no doubt that many a rule which formerly was a rule of International Comity
only is nowadays a rule of International Law. And it is certainly to be expected that this
development will go on in future also, and that thereby many a rule of present International Comity will in future become one of International Law.”) The passage is reproduced without substantial changes in OPPENHEIM, supra note 21, at 51.
29. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 134 (1812); Hazel Fox, International Law and Restraints on the Exercise of Jurisdiction by National Courts of States, in
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national law, the question may arise of what significance, if any, this origin
should have. In any event, while it has been argued that reading a rule of
international law with comity in mind could, for example, “determine what
is required by good faith, which takes into account reliability based on
tradition and expectations of courtesy.”30 Reliance on the principle is, in
any event, limited to elucidating the meaning and purpose of the rule
itself.31
B.

Comity in Private International Law

1.

Background

The history of the notion of comity in private international law is very
much a history of the concept of sovereignty.32 With the development of
the Westphalian system, territorial sovereignty and freedom from interference were consecrated as the essential pillars of the new world order, and a
system of territorial law replaced the old personal statutes.33 Still, the
transnational commercial relations that flourished on the European continent were not ready for such rigidity.34 Accordingly, comity was developed
as a doctrine intended to mitigate the ill-effects of strict territoriality.35
The doctrine was developed in the Netherlands by scholars seeking to
answer the specific problem of which law should govern a specific legal
relationship.36 In its most celebrated formulation, by Ulrich Huber, the
doctrine provided an elegant solution based on three axioms, the first two
reaffirming the principle of territorial sovereignty, and the third postulatINTERNATIONAL LAW, 344 (Malcolm Evans ed., 2010); Jasper Finke, Sovereign Immunity:
Rule, Comity or Something Else?, 21 EUR. J. INT. LAW 853, 870– 71 (2010). It must be
pointed out that there exist, in this area, references to comity that blur the distinction.
According to Collins, for example, “[i]t is no doubt in the sense of binding rules of
public international law that the expression is used” with reference to immunity. Laurence Collins, Comity in Modern Private International Law, in REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT
OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR PETER NORTH, 96– 97 (James
Fawcett ed., 2002).
30. Kämmerer, supra note 27, § 8.
31. See e.g., Cudak v. Lithuania, App. No. 15869/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 23, 2010)
(“The Court must first examine whether the limitation pursued a legitimate aim. In this
connection, it observes that State immunity was developed in international law out of
the principle par in parem non habet imperium, by virtue of which one State could not be
subject to the jurisdiction of another. The Court considers that the grant of immunity to
a State in civil proceedings pursues the legitimate aim of complying with international
law to promote comity and good relations between States through the respect of another
State’s sovereignty.”). The matter will be further investigated infra Part III.
32. KURT LIPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 16 (1981); Thomas Schultz & David Holloway, Retour sur la comity, deuxième
partie: La comity dans l’histoire du droit international privé, J. DROIT INT’L 571, 573
(2012).
33. Id. at 576– 77.
34. See RODOLFO DE NOVA, HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION TO CONFLICT
OF LAWS 441 (1966); Harold G. Maier, Resolving Extraterritorial Conflicts, or There and
Back Again, 25 VA. J. INT’L L. 7, 10 (1984).
35. CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 150 (2d ed. 2015).
36. JOHANNES VOET, COMMENTARIUS AD PANDECTAS. (1698); PAULUS VOET, DE STATUTIS
EORUMQUE CONCURSU LIBER SINGULARIS (1661).
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ing that state authorities could have applied foreign laws to govern private
interactions, “so far as they do not cause prejudice to the power or rights”
of the state concerned.37
There is no genuine consensus as to the issue of whether the third
axiom was meant to grant absolute discretion to the national authorities of
one nation or was, on the contrary, a simple description of the current
practices.38 Huber’s understanding of international law was fundamentally Grotian, and it is not inconceivable that his intention might have been
to qualify the rule as an international usage— if not as a custom proper.39
It was comity’s discretionary component, however, that had the most significant impact, especially in the common law world.40 Lord Mansfield in
England and Joseph Story in the United States realized the significance of
the concept, and the latter in particular granted widespread recognition to
Huber’s views— though, according to some, he did so at the cost of some
inaccuracies.41 A United States Supreme Court Justice, Story did not see
comity as amounting to anything more than a rather imperfect obligation,
arising “from mutual interest and utility, from a sense of the inconveniences which would result from a contrary doctrine.”42 The Supreme
Court later produced what still is the most influential statement of the
doctrine. In Hilton v Guyot, a decision of immeasurable influence, Justice
Gray defined comity as “neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and goodwill, upon the other.”43 Comity was
in fact, Justice Gray continued, “the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience and
to the rights of its own citizens or of other under the protection of its
laws.”44
2.

Current Uses of Comity

With the unfolding of the positivist revolution, comity ceased to be
considered a suitable basis for private international law.45 Yet, as Lawrence Collins noted in 2002, the use of the term by the judiciary remains
37. This translation appears in ERNEST GUSTAV LORENZEN, HUBER’S DE CONFLICTU
LEGUM, in SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 139 (1947). See also the text in
Ernest G. Lorenzen, Story’s Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws: One Hundred Years
after, 48 HARV. L. REV. (1934); Paul supra note 6, at 15– 16.
38. DE NOVA, supra note 34, at 449.
39. Id. at 450.
40. Id.
41. ALAN WATSON, JOSEPH STORY AND THE COMITY OF ERRORS: A CASE STUDY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 38 (1992).
42. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC: IN
REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES,
DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS (1834) (quoting SAMUEL LIVERMORE, DISSERTATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS WHICH ARISE FROM THE CONTRARIETY OF THE POSITIVE LAWS OF
DIFFERENT STATES AND NATIONS 28 (1828)).
43. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 143 (1895).
44. Id.
45. CHESHIRE, NORTH & FAWCETT: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, (James Fawcett et al.
eds., 14th ed. 2008); Collins refers in particular to the description of comity as “grating

R
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extensive, regardless how much it is frowned upon in textbooks.46 In its
modern incarnation, the “doctrine of comity” requires courts to place trust
in and not interfere with foreign courts, as well as to give “full faith and
credit to, or [respect] the conclusiveness of, the acts of foreign institutions”;
at the same time, it provides the principles that should guide these practices.47 With some approximation, the uses of comity may be classified
according to a taxonomy proposed by Harold Koh, which distinguishes
between legislative (or prescriptive) comity, judicial comity, and executive
comity.48 The first two concern the application of foreign law or the limitation of the reach of local law, as well as the recognition of foreign decisions or the use of discretion to limit the jurisdiction of domestic courts.49
The third, instead, commands deference when foreign sovereign interests
are at stake and provides a basis for the “act of state doctrine”— which bars
a court from sitting in judgment of the acts that another sovereign state
performs in its territory— and does not necessarily fit well with the other
two categories.50 All these uses reflect, as Donald Childress puts it, “a set
of ideas about sovereign-sovereign relations that courts can point to and
take into account when adjudicating transnational disputes.”51 In the dayto-day administration of justice, comity tends, however, to be a simpler
matter, and operates as a judicial tool in such a way that, in Adrian Briggs’s
words, “the language of the comity of sovereigns . . . feels out of place.”52
In practice, comity has been invoked as an upper limit to restrain the reach
of domestic law in cases concerning issues as diverse as competition and
human rights. It has been considered a relevant factor in the granting of
recognition to foreign and international judicial decisions, and interpreted
as counseling restraint in passing judgment on the sovereign acts of other
states; further, it has also been considered as a compelling reason to refrain
from adjudication in cases of international litispendence (actual or simply
foreseen) and a significant parameter for the granting of anti-suit
injunctions.53
to the ear when it proceeds from a court of law.” Collins, supra note 29, at 96– 97. The
phrase is Samuel Livermore’s, supra note 42, at 39.
46. See Collins, supra note 29, at 96– 97.
47. Adrian Briggs, The Principle of Comity in Private International Law, 354 in
RECUEIL DES COURS DE L’ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 65, 91.
48. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 6, 80,
102 (2008); Donald Earl III Childress, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11, 48 (2010).
49. KOH, supra note 48.
50. Id; Childress, supra note 48, at 48. On the emergence of executive comity and
the act of state doctrine as a way to “accommodate respect for foreign sovereignty with
growing American intercourse with other nations,” see Harold Koh, Transnational Public
Law Litigation, YALE L.J. 2347, 2357 (1991).
51. Childress, supra note 48, at 60.
52. Briggs, supra note 47, at 89.
53. On the operation of comity, see Childress, supra note 48; Paul, supra note 6; Joel
R. Paul, The Transformation of International Comity, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19,
36– 37 (2008); Thomas Schultz & Jason Mitchenson, Navigating Sovereignty and Transnational Commercial Law: The Use of Comity by Australian Courts, 12 J. PRIV. INT’L LAW
(2016).
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Comity, not entirely unlike equity, operates infra and praeter legem,
but never overrides a command of the sovereign.54 In practice, while the
transnational regulatory web has become denser, comity still remains a
useful tool in the hands of courts, capable as it is of operating as a lubricant or counterbalancing “the inadequacy of the normative criteria” necessary to solve jurisdictional conflicts.55
3.

New Understandings of Comity

While sovereignty constitutes the traditional theoretical underpinning
of the doctrine, it does not follow that it covers the ways in which comity
has been used or necessarily matches the evolution of its understanding.
These changes have occurred through gradual— but radical— changes in the
backdrop of transnational adjudication, so that it has been referenced to
justify instances of deference to “the needs of the international commercial
system,”56 to support transnationally consistent interpretations of international instruments (public or private alike),57 and, more generally, to further the “mutual interests of all nations in a smoothly functioning
international legal regime.”58
Moreover, comity constitutes a key concept for understanding judicial
networks. Anne-Marie Slaughter has convincingly relied on this notion to
explain certain dynamics.59 In her view, comity constitutes one of the
building blocks of judicial dialogue occurring in the “global community”
of national and international courts, offering “the framework and the
ground rules for a global dialogue among judges in the context of specific
cases.”60 According to her model, courts would respect foreign courts “qua
courts . . . rather than simply as the face of a foreign government,” recognizing them as “co-equals in the global task of judging,” though with a
distinctive emphasis on individual rights and the judicial role in protecting
them.61
To be sure, Slaughter’s theory is not without its critics and it has been
54. Briggs, supra note 47, at 87.
55. ELISA D’ALTERIO, LA FUNZIONE DI REGOLAZIONE DELLE CORTI NELLO SPAZIO AMMINISTRATIVO GLOBALE 190 (2011); Briggs, supra note 47.
56. For example, giving effect to an arbitration clause that covered antitrust matters,
traditionally considered non-arbitrable, see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 615 (1985). The decision was also cited in ADF Group
Inc. v. United States ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/1, Award, P 15 (Jan. 9, 2003).
57. Paul, supra note 6; Schultz & Mitchenson, supra note 53. Thomas Schultz &
Niccolò Ridi, How Comity Makes Transnationalism Work (King’s College London Dickson
Poon School of Law Paper No. 2017-14, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2897538.
58. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 555
(1987).
59. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, 87 (2004). Anne-Marie Slaughter,
A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 191, 194 (2003) [hereinafter Global
Community]; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103,
1112– 13 (1999) [hereinafter Judicial Globalization].
60. Global Community, supra note 59, at 211, 206.
61. Judicial Globalization, supra note 59, at 206.
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suggested that it is, to a large extent, quite starry-eyed.62 Yet, it has the
merit of emphasising the role of judges and arbitrators— national and international— as facilitators of the coordination of legal regimes.63 In this
guise, comity is a primary rule of conduct addressed to judges and arbitrators, asking them to balance some of the variegated interests implied in
making one legal regime prevail over another in a specific instance.64 Such
a theory of comity underscores the importance of balancing efforts, and is
hardly “arbitrary and dangerous” as the traditional critique has often
suggested.65
C.

Comity: A Summary

One problem with most of the scholarship on comity is that it almost
invariably defines the concept in the negative or indirectly.66 For the sake
of clarity and the discussion that follows, but without any claim of exhaustiveness, we attempt to offer a positive, working definition. We understand
comity as a judicial tool which, pursuant to an accepted paradigm on the
allocation of regulatory authority (such as sovereignty), directs courts to
engage in acts of restraint or recognition. This concretely translates into
the following actions taken by courts: fine-tuning the reach of domestic
substantive law; resorting to discretionary abstention in case of actual or
foreseen jurisdictional conflicts; granting respect and recognition to the
judgments of their foreign counterparts or presuming that foreign law and
acts are valid; or otherwise respecting an expression of coequal authority
that does not infringe its external limits. By extension, the term comity
also designates the rationale for the set of judicial tools and techniques
developed to achieve these goals.
This understanding of comity essentially originates in private international law. But as we will try to show, it can also helpfully be used— and
actually is helpfully used— in public international law. This is particularly
so in international adjudication, to which we now turn.
II. The Potential of Comity in International Adjudication
Comity, as we have already mentioned, is routinely used in domestic
adjudication, and not at all unheard of in international fora.67 Its re-emergence, however, is linked to a specific phenomenon: the proliferation of
international courts and tribunals.68 In this context, the concept of comity
62. Alex Mills & Tim Stephens, Challenging the Role of Judges in Slaughter’s Liberal
Theory of International Law, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2005).
63. Global Community, supra note 59, at 192– 93.
64. Id. at 206.
65. T.H. HEALY, Théorie générale de l’ordre public, in 9 RECUEIL DES COURS DE
L’ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1925) 411, 433; see Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53, 70 (1991).
66. Elisa D’Alterio, From Judicial Comity to Legal Comity: A Judicial Solution to Global
Disaster? 9 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 394, 396 (2011).
67. Paul, supra note 6, at 5– 6, 50– 51.
68. CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LIS PENDENS IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 299, 421
(2009).
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may have the potential to solve, or at least mitigate, some of the problems
arising from a disorderly multiplication of competing authorities.
A.

Proliferation and its Implications

The multiplication of international judicial institutions is likely one of
the most significant developments to have ever occurred in the international legal system. Its causes have been identified, on the one hand, in the
increased willingness of states to submit to international adjudication and,
on the other hand, in the inevitable specialisation of certain fields.69 A
burgeoning and spread of international courts and tribunals resulted, differing in their mandates, the rules they apply, the status of the parties to
the disputes they resolve, and the very inclusiveness of their jurisdictions—
which tend to grow more inclusive and difficult to elude as international
adjudication moves from a consensual to a compulsory paradigm.70
Proliferation is a divisive topic. For some, a numerous and diverse set of
judicial institutions may better serve the interests of justice, efficiency, and
party autonomy, because different approaches to the same matters can ultimately spark legal development.71 Others contend that proliferation is a
reason for concern, both for the parties to the dispute and the international
legal system as a whole.72 If the problem is seen through this lens, the
value of comity comes quite naturally into focus. With more international
courts comes a greater risk of parallel proceedings, instances of forum
shopping, conflicting decisions, and diverging interpretations of the same
rules of law that may bring about “fragmentation” issues as a consequence
of the move towards specialisation.73 Conflicts may occur between international courts and tribunals and their counterparts, but can also easily
involve national courts.74 There exists ample room for inter-systemic and
infra-systemic conflicts, which have further complicated the resolution of
certain disputes and diminished the overall trust in international dispute
settlement.
The root of the problem is threefold: First, “general international law
does not provide for jurisdiction-regulating rules.”75 Second, in most cases
the treaties establishing international courts and tribunals do not
expressly provide rules governing their relationships with the jurisdictions
69. BROWN, supra note 13, at 15– 21; Geir Ulfstein, International Courts and Judges:
Independence, Interaction, and Legitimacy, N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. & POL 849, 857 (2014).
70. Cesare P.R. Romano, The Shift from the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm in
International Adjudication: Elements for a Theory of Consent, The, 39 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. &
POL. 791, 794– 95 (2006).
71. Jacob Katz Cogan, Competition and Control in International Adjudication, 48 VA.
J. INT’L L. 411, 447– 48 (2007).
72. Gilbert Guillaume, Advantages and Risks of Proliferation: A Blueprint for Action, 2
J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 300, 301 (2004).
73. Id; see Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law: Report of the Study Group
of the International Law Commission, para. 8, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006).
74. See YUVAL SHANY, REGULATING JURISDICTIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL COURTS 75 (2007).
75. BROWN, supra note 12, at 29.
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of their counterparts or national jurisdictions.76 Third, jurisdictional provisions of individual international courts and tribunals are characterized
by some degree of rigidity: as James Crawford puts it, it is precisely this
lack of elasticity that produces the problems generally blamed on the
proliferation phenomenon.77
The use of comity has the potential of alleviating some of the problems
arising from this rigidity, improving coordination between overlapping
jurisdictions, and mitigating the undesired effects of unilateral forum shopping by encouraging a sound management of simultaneously pending proceedings and the choice of the most suitable forum. Further, it can serve
as a theoretical basis to foster overall coordination between judicial bodies,
prompting them to accord respect to the decisions of other international
courts and tribunals and, more generally, creating a framework for their
jurisdictional interaction— a framework which at the same time encourages
cross-fertilization and “promotes the systematic nature of international
law.”78
B.

Challenges in Using Comity for International Adjudication

A traditional understanding of comity, as we pointed out in section 1,
links it to sovereignty.79 Can a principle developed to deal with issues
regarding sovereignty— in a private international law dimension— be adequately used to deal with jurisdictional arrangements within the international judiciary? To answer the question, we first argue that horizontality,
which is at the heart of sovereignty, is not an inappropriate ordering model
for the relationship of the competences of international courts and tribunals. This in turn leads us to the transposition of conflicts of law to regime
interactions. We finally take a step back from these considerations, which
are arguably overly doctrinal and insufficiently pragmatic, and turn to
comity as a tool of judicial reasoning.
1.

Horizontality as an Ordering Model

The global arrangement of states is not so different from the global
arrangement of international judicial bodies. As James Crawford puts it,
comity “arises from the horizontal arrangements of state jurisdictions . . . .
and the field’s lack of a hierarchical system of norms.”80 In the interstate
system, horizontality is a consequence of the principle of sovereign equality of states; in the international system, it is the ordering model of the
“new style of public international law litigation.”81
76. MCLACHLAN, supra note 68, at 44.
77. JAMES CRAWFORD, CHANCE, ORDER, CHANGE: THE COURSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
THE GENERAL COURSE ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 211 (2014).
78. BROWN, supra note 12, at 29; SHANY, supra note 74, at 179– 81; VAN HARTEN,
SOVEREIGN CHOICES AND SOVEREIGN CONSTRAINTS: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN INVESTMENT
TREATY ARBITRATION 117, 117 (2013); D’Alterio, supra note 66, at 416.
79. LIPSTEIN, supra note 32, at 14.
80. CRAWFORD, supra note 7, at 485.
81. MCLACHLAN, supra note 68, at 41.
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It is true that not all international judicial bodies are created equal,
with some having, according to an accepted classification, universal jurisdiction ratione personae, others a regional mandate, a general competence
rationae materiae or a high degree of specialization.82 However, despite
some advocacy of a more central role for the International Court of Justice,83 no tribunal currently holds such a central function,84 and indeed
one should recall that when the problem concerns international tribunals,
“the notion of a court of a court of general jurisdiction is an inapt analogy.”85 Some may have greater jurisdictional reach, but none formally
stands out as hierarchically superior to the others: thus their potential
clashes still occur in a horizontal dimension.86
More intriguing is the problem of the exercise of comity by international courts towards national courts, and vice versa. As a principle, comity has sometimes been identified as the basis of particular aspects of the
relationship between courts of different orders.87 The broader question,
however, is whether it can help overcome the lack of jurisdictional rules
and principles governing the relationship of their competences.88 Sovereignty-based arguments may cut both ways, but at least they are useful in
justifying different types of “deferential review” concerning the acts of a
state.89
82. Shany, supra note 13, at 29.
83. The United Nations Charter, on the other hand, expressly provides for the possibility of entrusting disputes to other tribunals, either already in operation or to be created, see U.N. Charter art. 95, para. 1.
84. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal System and the International Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. & POL. 791,
798– 99 (1998); see generally Rosalyn Higgins, A Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations
from the Bench, 55 INT’L COMP. L.Q. (2006); Ulfstein, supra note 69, at 849– 50.
85. James Crawford & Penelope Nevill, Relations between International Courts and
Tribunals: The “Regime Problem,” in REGIME INTERACTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FACING
FRAGMENTATION 235, 249 (Margaret A. Young ed., 2012).
86. See Romano, supra note 70, at 848.
87. SABINO CASSESE, I TRIBUNALI DI BABELE. I GIUDICI ALLA RICERCA DI UN NUOVO ORDINE
GLOBALE 87– 88 (2009).
88. For an example of an arbitral tribunal that established its jurisdiction to hear the
case, but stayed its proceedings in favor of the domestic courts, which had been selected
as the appropriate forum in a contract clause through a decision on the admissibility of
claims. The move has generally been described as based on comity, see Société Générale
de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, (Jan. 29, 2004) 8 Rep. 518 (2005) [hereinafter Société Générale v.
Philippines]; Michael Waibel, Coordinating Adjudication Processes, in THE FOUNDATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY INTO PRACTICE, 505 (Zachary Douglas, Joost Pauwelyn, & Jorge E. Viñuales eds., 2014); SHANY, supra note 74, at 74– 76.
One of the arbitrators of the case expressly stated that the tribunal stayed its proceedings “in the interests of comity.” James Crawford, Continuity and Discontinuity in International Dispute Settlement: An Inaugural Lecture, 1 J. INT’L DISPUTE SETTL. 3, 22 (2010).
On the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility, see generally Jan Paulsson,
Jurisdiction and admissibility, in GLOBAL REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMERCE
AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 601 (Gerald Asken et al. eds., 2010).
89. The margin of appreciation doctrine has been considered one such example, see
SHANY, supra note 74, at 185.
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Conflict of Laws Analogies and Regime Interaction

If one takes on the view that jurisdictional clashes occur in a horizontal dimension, conflict of laws analogies become alluring, in particular if
one has in mind the “jurisdictional” nature of these clashes.90 Such comparisons are not novel, and have been employed to describe the overlaps
between the functional jurisdictions of international organisations, which,
as was submitted, presented “a closer analogy with the problem of conflict
of laws than with the problem of conflicting obligations within the same
legal system.”91
There is merit in the idea of these analogies, but how far they can be
used in practice is a distinct question. From the perspective of an international adjudicator, it is possible to single out rather useful doctrines, such
as those of governmental interest analysis or the “comparative impairment
principle.”92 With some simplification, the first requires the interpreter to
look to the specific policy goals underlying the provisions to be applied.93
The second “requires the interpreter to weigh the relative interests of the
conflicting legal systems” with a view to determining which among them
“would be most greatly impaired by a legal decision, assuming that that
decision were to become a general practice.”94
The main problem with these conflicts of law approaches is that, while
they are implemented at the judicial level, they mainly relate to choice of
law matters, and cannot do much for the resolution of jurisdictional conflicts— as such— between courts. The perspective may change slightly
when it comes to the application of substantive law, or when international
adjudication is embedded, as it often is, in a certain “regime.” Granted, the
very use of the word regime, in the sense of “regime interactions,” which is
a loan from international relations literature, is somewhat controversial in
the field of international law.95 But it is not without analytical purchase.
Broadly, regime interactions scholarship deals with sets of norms, decision-making procedures and organisations coalescing around functional
issue-areas.96 More to the point, it addresses questions relating to overlaps
90. For a critique of this “temptation,” see JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 8– 10 (2003).
91. C. Wilfred Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 30 BR. Y.B. INT’L L. 401,
403 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 1953); see also Joel P. Trachtman, Institutional Linkage: Transcending “Trade and . . . ,” 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 77 (2002).
92. See generally William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (1963) (explaining the principle of comparative impairment).
93. BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS. 584– 628 (1963).
For a concise critique of this approach, see PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS 251– 52 (2012).
94. On the principle of comparative impairment, see DIRK PULKOWSKI, THE LAW AND
POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL REGIME CONFLICT 333– 34 (2014); see generally Baxter, supra
note 92.
95. MARGARET A. YOUNG, Introduction: The Productive Friction Between Regimes, in
REGIME INTERACTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FACING FRAGMENTATION 1, 1– 2 (Margaret A.
Young ed., 2012).
96. Id. at 23.
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of these areas and their conflicts, and methods with which certain agents—
such as international organisations— should engage in interaction and
accommodation, and the basis of any such power to do so.97 What we
must observe, in this regard, is that the function of an international court
cannot be easily isolated from the regime to which it pertains. Their judicial process, and “the law-making that occurs contingently in litigation,”
have implications that have bearing on the interaction between different
regimes.98 In the search for a solution to jurisdictional conflicts, this perspective must perforce be taken into account.
3.

Comity: Between Judicial Tool and Meta-Principle of Coordination

Comity may offer a possible solution to conflicts occurring between
international jurisdictions. As a concept, it pertains to the realm of judicial
reasoning and behavior. As Crawford and Nevill have observed, judges
and arbitrators owe allegiance to their jurisdictional mandate, and their
approaches in seeking coordination— rather than competition— between
different regimes might be described as a “meta-position,” or even as an
exercise of imagination.99 Still, as the authors continue, there is no
“informing meta-principle” from which easy answers can be drawn.100
Rather, when jurisdictional overlaps between international courts and
tribunals are seen as a form of regime conflict and interaction, we are left
with the troublesome realisation that no hard and fast rules exist for their
resolution, though concerns about legitimacy and the risk of managerialism are hard to deflect.101
The arguments for hard rules and final arbiters are quite compelling,
but, so far, these are desiderata that do not lie in the realm of what is
accessible. What we do have, instead, is the understanding that conflicts
can be otherwise managed. “A problem,” Philip Jessup wrote in his Storrs
lectures, “may also be resolved not by the application of law (although
equally not in violation of law) but by a process of adjustment— an extralegal or metajuridical means.”102 Comity is one such principle— or “metaprinciple.”103 Its potential, which we attempted to unpack in the previous
sections, is revealed by its historical evolution and continual application at
the domestic (so to speak) level. We submit that, lacking (unlikely) hierarchical solutions, comity may assist international courts and tribunals in
mediating jurisdictional conflicts between themselves, balancing their
coordination efforts with the need to provide justice in individual cases.104
97. Id.
98. Crawford & Nevill, supra note 85, at 250.
99. Id.; PHILIPPA WEBB, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INTEGRATION AND FRAGMENTATION
203– 04 (2013).
100. Crawford & Nevill, supra note 85, at 259.
101. MARGARET A. YOUNG, TRADING FISH, SAVING FISH: THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN
REGIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 276, 276– 77 (2011).
102. PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 6 (1956).
103. Crawford & Nevill, supra note 85, at 243.
104. CRAWFORD, supra note 77, at 208.
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Of course, “managerialism” is a risk, and the proposition that the
degree to which judges are required to strive for the “maintenance of the
integrity of the international legal system . . . [and] the broader idea of an
international rule of law’ is hardly uncontested.”105 Still, there is little
doubt that international adjudication has overcome its quasi-arbitral beginnings,106 and that, when it comes to the proper and sound administration
of justice (a concept, we should perhaps emphasise, which has deeper
moral implications than that of “the rule of law”107), community interests
(or something much akin to them) are at stake.108 As far as international
courts and tribunals are concerned, judges pursue these interests the best
way they can, through the use of shared assumptions, methodological
tools, the responsible use of legal doctrine, and— perhaps most importantly— with the limitations that their own profession calls for.109
Comity does not simply respond to the hopes for coordination within
the international judiciary— and, more broadly, the international legal system. It is also something that international adjudicators can and know
how to employ in order to attain these goals.110 With this in mind, comity
can be employed to ease other types of conflict. For example, comity could
act as a principle informing the use by certain international tribunals of
extrasystemic elements imported from other legal regimes, for indeed the
use of such “outside law” is not devoid of complications and calls for a
careful balancing of the interests at stake.111
105. Andreas Paulus, International Adjudication, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 207, 221 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010); see generally ROSALYN
HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT (1995) (detailing law and process perspective); W. Michael Reisman, ‘Case Specific Mandates’ versus
‘Systemic Implications’: How Should Investment Tribunals Decide?: The Freshfields Arbitration Lecture, 29 ARB. INT’L 131 (2013) (arguing that save for a few narrow exceptions
international investment tribunals should confine themselves to a case-specific
methodology).
106. Paulus, supra note 105, at 223.
107. Thomas Schultz, Against Consistency in Investment Arbitration, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY INTO PRACTICE 297, 297– 98
(Zachary Douglas, et al. eds., 2014).
108. On community interests, see Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community
Interest in International Law, RECUEIL DES COURS DE L’ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
1994, at 217, 235– 43 (outlining international peace and security, solidarity between
developed and developing countries, protection of the environment, the “common heritage” concept, international concern with human rights, as community interests we
should kept at the forefront of international law).
109. PULKOWSKI, supra note 94; Crawford & Nevill, supra note 85, at 249; Bruno
Simma, Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner, 20 EUR. J.
INT’L. L. 265, 275– 79, 289 (2009).
110. Paul, supra note 53, at 22.
111. On this type of regime interaction and the implications for international governmental organizations (as a possible analogy), see YOUNG, supra note 101 at 279; see
generally José E. Alvarez, “Beware: Boundary Crossings”— A Critical Appraisal of Public
Law Approaches to International Investment Law, 17 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 171 (2016)
(discussing different kinds of complications inherent in boundary crossing); see YOUNG,
supra note 101, at 279.
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An Uncertain Umpire? The Case of Competing Proceedings

What type of relief exactly could comity provide to the problem of
jurisdictional conflicts? Answering this question requires a more advanced
understanding of the problem of regulation of jurisdiction in international
adjudication. This section examines the potential of comity as an instrument to alleviate the ill effects that derive from the pendency of parallel
proceedings in the same dispute.
1.

The Regulation of Jurisdiction: Jurisdictional Clauses and General
Principles

General international law does not provide for rules governing the
jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals, but the constituting
instruments of the latter often do. Normally, they do so indirectly, namely
through their jurisdictional clauses. According to the classification proposed by Yuval Shany, it is possible to distinguish between exclusive jurisdictional clauses, barring litigation before any other forum, and nonexclusive jurisdictional clauses.112 Exclusive jurisdiction clauses can be
further qualified as flexible or inflexible, depending on whether they can
be derogated from; non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses can be unqualified or
residual, such as Article 282 UNCLOS.113 The latter species of jurisdictional clauses may be chosen for the purpose of limiting, to some extent,
unilateral forum shopping.114 In contrast, very few instruments include
rules intended to coordinate multiple proceedings and, more broadly,
mediate conflicts.115
Some have argued that, in the absence of a hierarchical system, the
instruments to achieve these results are to be found outside the framework
of their own legal order.”116 The central question is whether the vacuum
can be filled with general jurisdiction-regulating principles. One such
principle is res judicata, a preclusion doctrine aimed at protecting the finality of the decision.117 Its applicability in international adjudication is well
112. SHANY, supra note 12, at 180.
113. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397, art. 282 (“If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention have agreed, through a general, regional or
bilateral agreement or otherwise, that such dispute shall, at the request of any party to
the dispute, be submitted to a procedure that entails a binding decision, that procedure
shall apply in lieu of the procedures provided for in this Part, unless the parties to the
dispute otherwise agree.”).
114. SHANY, supra note 12, at 202– 04.
115. According to Shany, Article 56(7) of the African Charter (barring the admissibility of communication from “other sources” dealing with cases “which have been settled
by these States involved in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United
Nations, or the Charter of the Organization of African Unity or the provisions of the
present Charter”) must be considered an implied res judicata clause. Id. at 225 (quoting
African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S.
217, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
116. MCLACHLAN, supra note 68, at 346.
117. Waibel, supra note 88, at 522.
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accepted,118 though recent judicial practice demonstrates that there still is
some degree of uncertainty as to its practical operation.119 There is ample
agreement that for res judicata to apply strict conditions must be satisfied:
these are normally reduced to a “triple identity test,” which is intended to
ascertain that persona, petitum, and causa petendi of the multiple disputes
are in fact the same.120 In international adjudication, this is easier said
than done. Due to a plethora of different treaty regimes, jurisdiction and
cause of action are intimately linked and meeting the conditions for the
operation of the principle is unlikely.121 Further, especially in investment
arbitration, it is quite possible that multiple arbitrations will be initiated by
formally different entities.122 As a consequence, there is a renewed interest
in less restrictive doctrine such as issue estoppel.123
While res judicata is intended to shield from the undesired consequences of sequential proceedings, lis alibi pendens deals with parallel proceedings, giving priority to the ones first established.124 Compared to res
judicata, its applicability in international adjudication does not enjoy the
same widespread support.125 Overall, the number of cases involving the
principle has been comparatively low, and no tribunal has authoritatively
pronounced on the issue.126 Further, the status of lis pendens as a general
principle of law has been disputed on the grounds that it is mainly a civil
law doctrine,127 and, it too requires the satisfaction of a strict triple identity test.128
118. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, at
89– 93, paras. 115– 20 (Feb. 26); see also BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS
APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 336 (1994); Shany, supra note 13, at
245; Pauwelyn & Salles, supra note 10, at 102; August Reinisch, The Use and Limits of
Res Judicata and Lis Pendens as Procedural Tools to Avoid Conflicting Dispute Settlement
Outcomes, 3 LAW & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIB. 37, 44– 45 (2004).
119. For example, see Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between
Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicar.
v. Colom.), Judgment, 17 (Mar. 2016), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/files/caserelated/154/154-20160317-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/BYZ2-9YFF].
120. Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.) 1927 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 13, 4, at 23 (dissenting
opinion of Ehrlich, J.); Pauwelyn & Salles, supra note 10, at 103.
121. Pauwelyn & Salles, supra note 10, at 104.
122. Waibel, supra note 88, at 523.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 523– 25.
125. Reinisch, supra note 118, at 44– 45 (justifying the principle as a corollary of res
judicata); see MCLACHLAN, supra note 7, at 57– 58 (arguing that the principle should be
applied, and that it does not import a strict “first seized” requirement). But see CRAWFORD, supra note 77, at 384; SHANY, supra note 12, at 220 (arguing that the status of the
principle is still unclear).
126. MCLACHLAN, supra note 68, at 180– 87; CRAWFORD, supra note 77, at 384. See
generally Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 6
(discussing, but failing to pronounce on the issue because the “triple identity test” was
not satisfied).
127. Gilles Cuniberti, Parallel Litigation and Foreign Investment Dispute Settlement, 21
ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 381, 383 (2006).
128. Pauwelyn & Salles, supra note 10, at 110.
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Moreover, while the application of res judicata enjoys virtually universal support as a matter of policy, the use of lis pendens has, at least on
occasion, been criticised. First, it has been observed that the simple fact
that a tribunal has already been given jurisdiction does not constitute a
guarantee that a dispute will be settled.129 Second, it has been argued that
the increase in litigation costs is a minor and, in any event, secondary issue
in international adjudication.130 This proposition is not entirely convincing, and does not take into account other adverse effects of duplicative litigation on any given dispute.131 Third, and perhaps more interesting, is the
contention that the pendency of parallel proceedings could be an incentive
for proverbially slow tribunals to issue their judgment first, a result that
can only be achieved if res judicata applies and lis alibi pendens does not
(encouraging a “race to ruling,” rather than a race to court).132
2.

On the Exercise of Jurisdiction: Comity and Inherent Powers

In the current international dispute settlement scenario, comity has
appeal as a technique for the management of jurisdictional conflicts arising
from the commencement of multiple proceedings before different courts or
tribunals.
When domestic courts employ comity, they do so by dismissing or
staying proceedings; thus, they adopt a decision not to exercise a jurisdiction that they indubitably have.133 The resolution of conflicts concerning
the allocation of regulatory (or jurisdictional) authority tends to take this
form, demanding the surrender of legal (or judicial) authority from one
legal system or regime to another.134 The same applies in international
adjudication, where coordinating efforts have been broadly labelled as
exercises in avoidance and temporization.135
Judicial discretion of this kind has faced comparatively few challenges
at the domestic level, at least in common law countries, where it is more
characteristic; doubts, as to the authority of a court of general jurisdiction,
remain the exception.136 Things tend to be different for international
tribunals: do they or do they not have the power to stay or dismiss proceed129. Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, 30 (July
26); Cuniberti, supra note 129, at 143.
130. Pauwelyn & Salles, supra note 10, at 108.
131. Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy
and the Fragmentation of International Law, STAN. L. REV. 595, 595– 98 (2007) (arguing
the creation of a plurality of fora along “narrow functionalist lines” and their overlapping
authority is detrimental to weaker states).
132. Pauwelyn & Salles, supra note 10, at 109; Waibel, supra note 88, at 518.
133. Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as
Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11, 47– 48 (2010).
134. A. Pillet, Théorie Continentale des Conflits de Lois, 2 RECUEIL DES COURS DE
L’ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 451, 472 (1924); see PULKOWSKI, supra note 94, at
330– 31.
135. Jeffrey L Dunoff, A New Approach to Regime Interaction, in REGIME INTERACTION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: FACING FRAGMENTATION 136, 156 (Margaret A. Young ed., 2012).
136. Frederick Schauer, The Dilemma of Ignorance: PGA Tour, Inc. v. Casey Martin,
2001 SUP. CT. REV. 267, 268– 69 (2001).
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ings? To be sure, it is possible for such a power to be provided for
expressly.137 However, the constitutive instruments of international courts
and tribunals are seldom exhaustive and, in order to fill the gap, reliance
has been placed on alternative sources of procedural rules and the more
controversial concept of “inherent power.”138
One possible solution is to qualify comity as a principle of international law139 or a general principle of law in the sense of Article 38(1)(c) of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice.140 Debates as to the suitability of such principles to constitute a source of procedural law have been
largely overcome, and the proposition that that “no sharp distinction”
exists in international law between substantive and adjectival aspects is
relatively uncontroversial.141 It must be pointed out, however, that the
scarcity of practice does not appear to warrant the conclusion that comity
fits squarely in the first category. By the same token, the fact that the principle of comity does not enjoy universal acceptance at the domestic level
seems to militate against it inclusion in the second.142
A preferable alternative is to find the source of discretion not to exercise jurisdiction in the inherent powers of international courts and tribunals.143 As Judge Higgins observed in her separate opinion in the Use of
Force cases, the inherent powers of a tribunal include that of not exercising
a jurisdiction that it has.144 Specifically, such powers are a corollary of the
judicial character of the tribunal and descend from the need to protect the
integrity of the judicial process.145 Their exercise is thus to be considered
possible, if exceptional.146 In other words, in this approach, inherent pow137. SHANY, supra note 74, at 172.
138. See Chester Brown, The Inherent Powers of International Courts and Tribunals, 76
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 195, 198 (2006).
139. We accept the definition employed by Crawford: “certain logical propositions
underlying judicial reasoning on the basis of existing international law.” See CRAWFORD,
supra note 21, at 37.
140. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, para. 1; SHANY, supra
note 74, at 261.
141. BROWN, supra note 12, at 37; SHABTAI ROSENNE, 1 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT 486 (1965).
142. SHANY, supra note 74, at 172. This result is not surprising: while it is accepted
that general principles of law may be sources of procedure, very few of them are applied
extensively at the national level. See BROWN, supra note 140, at 198– 205; see generally
CHENG, supra note 120 (discussing general principles of law).
143. CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 40.
144. Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Montenegro v. Belg.), Separate Opinion of
Judge Higgins, 2004 I.C.J. para. 11 (Dec. 15) [hereinafter Use of Force], (discussing the
possibility of summarily dismissing abusive claims). See Brown, supra note 12, at 249.
Contra Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.), Judgment, 1963 I.C.J. 15, 29 (Dec. 2)
(“[T]he Court is not compelled in every case to exercise that jurisdiction. There are
inherent limitations on the exercise of the judicial function which the Court, as a court
of justice, can never ignore . . . . The Court itself, and not the parties, must be the
guardian of the Court’s judicial integrity.”).
145. See Use of Force, supra note 144, at para. 12.
146. Id. at para.12. For the Court to discharge itself from carrying out the primary
obligation of deciding disputes in accordance with international law “must be considered as highly exceptional and a step to be taken only when the most cogent considerations of judicial propriety so require.” Caroline Henckels, Overcoming Jurisdictional
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ers must be justified on the basis of the function of the international court
concerned— and, arguably, of the general function of international adjudication. This last point warrants further consideration as it implies the
question of whether the role of international courts and tribunals should
be restricted to the settlement of the particular dispute between the parties
or have wider implications.147
The “inherent powers” approach is advantageous for two main reasons: first, it allows rejecting the misconstruction of comity as a jurisdictional rule and qualifying it as a set of principles that should inform the
exercise of jurisdiction.148 Second, it allows dispensing with an express
provision of the power to stay or dismiss proceedings in the constitutive
instrument of the tribunal. Nevertheless, there are limits to its operation.
In general, a provision or a effect of either the constitutive instrument as a
whole or the very function of an international tribunal could exclude the
existence of an inherent power.149 It is doubtful, for example, whether an
exclusive jurisdictional clause could warrant the exercise of such discretion. By the same token, it questionable whether certain dispute settlement
bodies possess the discretion to stay proceedings.
The case of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism can provide a
useful illustration of the problem. Some have questioned the existence of
such discretion for the panels for different reasons. For example, some
have contended that they lack inherent powers due to the atypical nature of
such bodies: a power to suspend proceedings would thus have to be based
on different grounds.150 Others have argued for the exclusion of a power
to stay proceedings on the grounds of the strict procedures and timeframes
the panels must respect.151 Finally, in Mexico– Soft Drinks the Panel
rejected Mexico’s request not to exercise its jurisdiction maintaining that it
did not have “discretion to decide whether or not to exercise [it] in a case
Isolationism at the WTO– FTA Nexus: A Potential Approach for the WTO, 19 EUR. J. INT’L. L.
571, 585 (2008) (quoting Judge Higgins reference to the Court’s dictum, in Nuclear
Tests (Austl. v. Fr.) 1974 I.C.J., para. 22).
147. Henckels, supra note 146, at 585.
148. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, The Principle of Compétence-Compétence in
International Adjudication, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN, 1059 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani & Jacob Cogan eds.,
2011).
149. Brown, supra note 12, at 91.
150. FRIEDL WEISS, THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, 1995– 2003, at 885 (Federico Ortino & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2004). According to Bartels, the panels or
the appellate body are not plagued with a complete lack of power to regulate their proceedings, but still have to base its decision on a positive grant of authority under the
World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). He concludes that it would be possible for a panel or the Appellate Body to suspend its proceedings on the basis of the Working Procedures they can adopt under Article 12.1 (or 17.9,
for the Appellate Body) DSU irrespective of the consent of the parties. As the Working
Procedures are adopted for the purpose of hearing a particular case, it would not be
possible to use them to decline jurisdiction altogether, but the result of a suspension of
proceedings might be attainable. Lorand Bartels, The Separation of Powers in the WTO:
How to Avoid Judicial Activism, 53 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 861, 862 (2004).
151. SHANY, supra note 74, at 265.
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properly before it.”152 The Appellate Body upheld the approach followed
by the Panel in Mexico– Soft Drinks, arguing that the Panel would not have
fulfilled its mandate of making “an objective assessment of the matter
before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the
applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements” if it
had declined to exercise a validly established jurisdiction.153 According to
Caroline Henckels, such an approach is rooted in “arid textualism” and
might be overcome by paying due regard to the purpose of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.154 Comity, she further argues, could thus be
used upon meeting the high threshold of “an inextricable connection to an
antecedent or concurrent dispute under another trade instrument . . . bearing in mind the need to ensure stability and predictability in the international trading system.”155 Such a conclusion seems correct in principle.
What is more, it is also buttressed by the recent practice of some international courts and tribunals, which have demonstrated an increasing willingness to suspend proceedings before them.156 However, the extent to
which other tribunals will be willing to do so is still unknown.
3.

The Potential of Comity: Advantages and Drawbacks

The application of the doctrine of comity has a number of advantages.
First of all, as a general abstention doctrine, it does not need to be provided
for expressly in the constitutive instrument of the tribunal concerned— provided that the tribunal possesses the powers necessary to exercise comity it
constitutes a readily available remedy against the dangers of abusive litigation.157 Second, and more attractive, its flexible character allows the decision-maker to defer the dispute to the jurisdiction of other tribunals in a
number of cases, without the need to satisfy the strict requirements of
either res judicata, lis alibi pendens and, where similarities apply, electa una
via provisions. Third, comity is predicated on the postulate that the tribunal exercising it has jurisdiction, in that it is not necessarily different from
the principles considered above, which are more accurately classified as
concerning the admissibility of claims.158 But, one might make the argument that res judicata and lis alibi pendens are hard-edged principles. Specifically, they are preclusion doctrines; as a consequence, as soon as the
requirements for their operation are met, they bar the adjudicator from
entertaining the dispute.159 In contrast, the doctrine of comity simply
152. WTO, Panel Report, Mexico— Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages,
paras. 7.4– 7.18, WT/DS308/R, Oct. 7, 2005.
153. Panel Report, Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, paras. 51– 53,
WTO Doc. WT/DS308/AB/R (adopted Mar. 6, 2006).
154. Henckels, supra note 146, at 589– 95.
155. Id. at 595, 597.
156. BROWN, supra note 12, at 250– 52.
157. SHANY, supra note 12, at 74.
158. Pauwelyn & Salles, supra note 10, at 92– 93; Gretta L. Walters, Fitting a Square
Peg into a Round Hole: Do Res Judicata Challenges in International Arbitration Constitute
Jurisdictional or Admissibility Problems? 29 J. INT’L. ARB. 651 (2012).
159. Pauwelyn & Salles, supra note 10, at 83.
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results in a tribunal using its discretion and refraining from exercising a
jurisdiction it has when hearing the case would not be appropriate. As a
consequence, it does not deprive the tribunal of its power to hear the dispute when the reasons not to do so (such as, for example, simultaneously
pending proceedings), albeit formally compelling, prove shaky as a matter
of substance.
Using comity is not entirely unproblematic: its operation is subject to
the tribunal exercising discretion, an idea that many constituencies could
find problematic when associated with adjudication. From the parties’
perspective, preclusion arguments may indeed be more attractive: a tribunal may have variegated reasons to be hesitant in declining to exercise its
jurisdiction. Its members may simply be convinced that they do not have
the power to make this decision, and err on the side of caution and give the
parties their proverbial “day in court.” Reluctance of this kind may also
occur even if there is no legal impediment: the conduct of the international
judiciary, just as of any body of individuals, is not only affected by considerations of justice and the parties’ interests. For example, as Cesare P. R.
Romano points out, permanent tribunals could be reluctant to defer a dispute to other judicial bodies due to the fear that doing so could negatively
affect their status in the area of international dispute settlement and the
problematic correlation between caseload and funding.160 In contrast, the
members of an arbitral tribunal can be said to have, from a law and economics perspective, a vested interest in making the dispute reach the merits
stage. It makes sense for them to increase the demand for arbitration.161
And, of course, even then mistakes may be made. For example, in the
MOX Plant case, the Annex VII Tribunal relied on comity to avoid a jurisdictional conflict, and, insofar as it based the decision on the virtually certain involvement of the European Court of Justice, its approach seems to be
informed by a correct, if overly prudent and deferential, understanding of
the principle.162 But, as Campbell McLachlan has observed, the tribunal
adopted its decision before the European Court, which undoubtedly has
the competence to decide on its jurisdiction, was even seized of the dispute.163 It is thus arguable that, had the tribunal decided otherwise, its
exercise of jurisdiction would not have infringed comity as no one had
initiated proceedings; perhaps, most importantly— the risk of leaving Ireland without any proceedings against the United Kingdom was a real
one.164
160. See Guillaume, supra note 72, at 391; Romano, supra note 71, at 80.
161. See Thomas Schultz, Arbitral Decision-Making: Legal Realism and Law & Economics, 6 J. INT’L. DISP. SETTLEMENT. 231, 241– 42 (2015).
162. MOX Plant Case (Order No. 4) (Perm. Ct. Arb. June 24, 2003).
163. MCLACHLAN, supra note 68, at 334.
164. The argument has also been made that, in affirming its exclusive jurisdiction,
the European Court of Justice de facto negated that the Annex VII Tribunal could rule on
its competence. MCLACHLAN, supra note 68, at 334. For a different narrative, against the
idea that the European Court proceeded some sort of usurpation, see Crawford & Nevill, supra note 85, at 254.
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III. Mentions of Comity by International Courts and Tribunals
The foregoing sections have sought to clarify, at a theoretical level, the
potential and shortcomings of the use of comity in international adjudication. In this section, we look more empirically at cases, which use comity.
A.

Comity as Opposed to “Legal Obligations”

First of all, in some of the cases, international courts and tribunals
have employed the notion of comity to clarify the legal nature of an obligation. For example, in Fisheries Jurisdiction, Judge Dillard appended a separate opinion in which he argued “in practice States accord deference to the
twelve-mile limit as a matter of legal obligation and not merely as a matter
of reciprocal tolerance or comity.”165
In Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France) the concept was only mentioned
in passing in Judge Barwick’s dissent, in which he criticized the view that
the dispute at issue was only a political difference “as to whether France
ought or ought not in comity to cease to test in the atmosphere of the South
Pacific.”166 In his opinion, there was a legal dispute and that the Court’s
finding that Australia application had no object was incorrect.167
Again, in Avena, the issue of comity was raised in Mexico’s argument
at the provisional measures stage.168 On the basis of a declaration by the
President of the United States to the effect that the nation will “discharge
its international obligations under the decision of the International Court
of Justice . . . in accordance with general principles of comity.”169 Mexico
argued that the United States’ reference to comity the made clear that it did
not believe to have any legal obligation.170 The Court did not address the
issue.171 Finally, in Jurisdictional Immunities, the Court referred to the
concept of comity to observe that the parties were in agreement as to the
applicable law and, in particular, they agreed that “immunity is governed
by international law and is not a mere matter of comity.”172
The European Court of Human Rights espoused a similar interpretation of the term in Mamatkulov.173 In this case, the Court observed that
previous practice had described the practice of complying with interim
165. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.) Separate Opinion of Judge Dillard, 1974 I.C.J.
3, 58 (July 25).
166. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 253, 446 (Dec. 20) (Barwick,
J. dissenting).
167. Id.
168. Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgement, 2009 I.C.J.311
(Jan. 19) [hereinafter Request for Interpretation]. See also Request for Interpretation,
(Judge Buergenthal dissenting).
169. I.C.J., Written Observations of the United States of America on the Application
for Interpretation of the Judgement of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) (Aug. 29, 2008), at 1– 2.
170. Id.
171. See generally Request for Interpretation, supra note 168.
172. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 99 para.
53 (Feb. 3).
173. Mamatkulov v. Turkey, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 293, 349.
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measures as “a matter of expediency and comity.”174
B.

Comity as Non-Interference

In a second group of cases, references to comity were made in connection with non-interference arguments.
The principle was referred to in Loewen as the source of the requirement of “continuous nationality.”175 According to the tribunal, the principle arose as a consequence of the fact that “[i]t was not normally the
business of one nation to be interfering into the manner in which another
nation handled its internal commerce.”176
Two cases of the Court of Justice of the European Communities concerned issues of regulation of competition: the first, Ahlström v. Commission, was part of the joined “wood pulp” cases.177 The comity argument
was raised by a number of Canadian applicants contended that regulating
their conduct— relating to activities performed outside of, but having
effects within Europe— the Commission had “infringed Canada’s sovereignty and thus breached the principle of international comity.”178 The
Court quickly dismissed the argument, stating that it amounted to questioning the Community’s jurisdiction to apply its competition rules.179
IBM v. Commission concerned entirely similar issues, the main difference
being that the conduct of the claimant was not only performed in another
jurisdiction (the United States), but also the subject of legal proceedings
there.180 The Court did not address the claim, and dismissed it on other
grounds.181 To this day, the Court has not modified its approach, and a
recent decision by the General Court referring to Ahlström reveals that the
timeworn dictum withstands the test of time.182
C.

Comity and the Management of Multiple Proceedings

In a third category of cases, references to comity concerned the coordination of multiple proceedings relating to the same dispute pending before
different national or international judicial bodies.
Perhaps the best-known instance of the use of comity was considered
in relation to parallel proceedings is the early ICSID case Southern Pacific
174. Id.
175. Loewen Group Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/98/3, Award,
para. 230 (June 26, 2003).
176. Id.
177. Joined Cases C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85, C-125– 29/85
(Wood Pulp Cases), Ahlström Osakeyhtiö v. Commission of European Communities,
1993 I-01307 ECR 1307.
178. Id. at para. 524.
179. Id.
180. Case C-60/81, IBM v. Comm’n, [1981] E.C.R. 2639, 2650.
181. Id. at 2655.
182. Case T-406/08, Industries chemiques du fluor (ICF) v. Comm’n [2013] E.C.R.
00000 (June 18), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62008TJ0406&lang1
=en&type=TXT&ancre= [https://perma.cc/6Q87-F5MB]; Wallishauser v. Austria, App
No. 156/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (July 17, 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-112194
[https://perma.cc/4CC7-GTRU].
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Properties.183 The dispute at issue had been referred to arbitration before
the International Chamber of Commerce and only later ICSID proceedings
were initiated.184 As domestic proceedings concerning the arbitration
clause were pending before the French Cour de Cassation, the Tribunal was
faced with the request to decline its jurisdiction.185 Eventually, the tribunal stayed its proceedings, but went to great lengths to clarify that, it was
doing so “in the interest of international judicial order, in its discretion and
as a matter of comity.”186 In its view, there was no rule of international
law preventing two tribunals whose jurisdictions extended to the same dispute from exercising such jurisdiction.187
Questions relating to comity were considered again in the MOX Plant
case.188 There the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) Annex VII Tribunal relied on “considerations of mutual respect and comity which should
prevail between judicial institutions” to justify the suspension of its proceedings in the face of a virtually certain involvement of the European
Court of Justice.189 Such an occurrence would have excluded the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under Article 282 of the UNCLOS.190 Comity was also
mentioned in the separate opinion appended by Judge Treves to the Order
on Provisional Measures issued by the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea in the same dispute.191 Treves regretted that a discussion on the
existence and content “of a customary law rule or of a general principle
concerning the consequences of litispendence, as well as considerations of
economy of legal activity and of comity between courts and tribunals’ had
not been included in the order.”192
Comity arguments were also raised in Itera International Energy.193
The respondent maintained that the claimant was trying to bring before the
ICSID Tribunal, under the cloak of ancillary claims, a wholly separate dispute, which was already the subject of separate proceedings before the
International Commercial Arbitration Court of the Russian Chamber of
Commerce.194 These proceedings had been initiated by the claimant and
had been going on for three years.195 According to the respondent, the
Tribunal’s dismissal of these claims would have avoided potentially conflicting decisions and served the interests of “efficiency and comity.”196
183. Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No ARB/84/3 (Nov. 1985).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. MOX Plant Case (Order No. 3) (Perm. Ct. Arb. June 24, 2003).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. MOX Plant Case, Separate Opinion of Judge Treves.
192. Id. at para. 5.
193. Itera International Energy LLC & Itera Group NV v. Georgia, Admissibility of
Ancillary Claims, ICSID Case No ARB/08/7 (Dec. 3, 2009).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at para. 81.
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Eventually, the claims were not found to arise from the same dispute and
the Tribunal did not address the issue of comity.197
The issue of comity was raised again in Achmea.198 The European
Commission had submitted written observations to propose a stay of the
PCA proceedings in order to avoid a potential conflict between its decision
and an ensuing ECJ ruling.199 It suggested that the PCA adopted the same
approach embraced in MOX Plant, where the arbitral tribunal had concluded that “considerations of mutual respect and comity” warranted a
stay of proceedings. According to the Commission, such considerations
formed “part of the general principles of law that the Tribunal must apply
by virtue of Article 8(6) of the [Bilateral Investment Treaty].”200 Ultimately, the Tribunal concluded that while the it wished to organize its proceedings “with full regard for considerations of mutual respect and comity
as regards other courts and institutions” it did not consider the questions
at issue “so far coextensive with the claims in the present case” to warrant a
suspension of the proceedings.201 Yet, the tribunal left open the possibility
of a later suspension if it were to become clear, “that the relationship
between the two sets of proceedings is so close as to be a cause of procedural unfairness or serious inefficiency.”202
Finally, questions concerning comity and the management of multiple
proceedings were discussed, rather thoroughly, in British Caribbean
Bank.203 In that case, the Respondent invoked the precedents of Southern
Pacific Properties and MOX Plant to argue that, when parallel proceedings
are pending, a tribunal may “in its discretion and as a matter of comity”
stay the exercise of its jurisdiction.204 The argument was accepted as a
matter of principle, and the Tribunal admitted that it had “a measure of
discretion with respect to the timing and conduct of the arbitration and
that municipal judicial proceedings may sometimes need to be taken into
account in the exercise of international comity.”205 However, the Tribunal
also observed that any such discretion “must be carefully exercised,” for to
do otherwise would have amounted to “[permitting] comity to frustrate a
claimant’s right to the arbitral forum and, potentially, to the relief offered
by the bilateral investment treaty under which the arbitration proceedings
were commenced.”206 In this respect, the Tribunal observed the situation
in the case at issue was entirely different from the precedent cited, as a stay
would not have been motivated by either an exclusive jurisdictional clause
197. Id. at para. 100.
198. Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, Case No. 2008-13 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 2008).
199. Id. at paras. 148– 50.
200. Id. at paras. 195– 96.
201. Id. at para. 292.
202. Id.
203. British Caribbean Bank Limited (Turks & Caicos) v. Gov’t of Belize, PCA Case
Repository No. 2010-18 paras. 179, 187 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2014).
204. Id. at para. 179.
205. Id. at para. 187.
206. Id.
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included in a contract (as in Société Générale de Surveillance (“SGS”) or
the exclusive jurisdiction vested in a certain forum by a treaty.207 What is
more, its determinations did not depend from the result of any action
before the domestic court, and, even then, none were currently pending.208
D.

Comity as Respect and Recognition

International juridical bodies have also relied on comity in order to
assist their reasoning about the respect to be granted to what we may
broadly refer to as the regulatory space of states: what faith and credit
should be accorded to states regarding their own conduct? What are the
appropriate evidential weight, evidential requirements, and standards of
review for the conduct of states? Four cases point the way.
In Soufraki, an investment arbitration, a reference to comity appears in
Omar Nabulsi’s dissenting opinion.209 The question concerned certificates of nationality issued by the Italian government.210 According to
Nabulsi, the tribunal had the power to make determinations of nationality,
but these had to be made in accordance with the proper law, which was, in
the case at issue, Italian law.211 In his view, “The Tribunal’s application of
rules other than the substantive rules of Italian law would be a manifest
excess of power.”212 Nabulsi went on to ask whether the “Act of State”
doctrine applied to the issue.213 This would have required that the tribunal “abstain[s] from inquiring into the validity of acts of the government of
another country,” namely the certificates of nationality.214 He answered
the question in the negative, finding that the doctrine did not apply to
international tribunals whose jurisdiction depends on the parties’ nationality.215 So the power of the tribunal to go beyond official certificates was
not up for debate.216 Yet, and this is the key point, he maintained that the
concept of “comity” required that “international tribunals should accord
respect to official certificates by treating them as “prima facie evidence.”217
A similar reference to comity and evidence, though dealing with a
qualitatively different issue, was made in Tokios Tokelës (also an investment
arbitration).218 The tribunal held that, when addressing the issue of allegations made against persons or bodies “in a position of [state] authority,”
evidentiary requirements could not be “heightened purely on the grounds
of deference or comity or otherwise.”219
207. Id. at para. 188.
208. Id. at para. 189.
209. Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/7, Separate Opinion
and Statement of Dissent by Omar Nabulsi (June 5, 2007).
210. See id. at para. 36.
211. See id. at para. 51.
212. Id. at para. 62.
213. See id. at 84.
214. Id.
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. Id.
218. Tokios Tokelës v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Award (July 26, 2007).
219. Id. at para. 124.
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In CCL, a commercial arbitration decided by a Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce Tribunal, the issue of comity was raised with reference to the
possibility of reviewing the conduct of a foreign state.220 The principle
was invoked by the respondent, who argued that “as a matter of international comity” the Tribunal should have been hesitant to review the acts of
Kazakhstan in its sovereign and judicial capacity, acting to enforce its laws
against its own government agency, absent a blatant abuse of power, which
clearly is not the case.221 The Tribunal “should at least give the sovereign,
non-commercial acts of Kazakhstan the deference that comity requires.”222
The claimant was lucky enough that comity was such an ambiguous concept, shrouded in misunderstandings, rarely if ever seriously examined— a
situation explained, as we may recall from the introduction to this Article,
by lawyers’ generally dismissive attitude for the concept. Hence the claimant could safely argue that comity was a public international law concept
referring to “non-binding rules of politeness, convenience and goodwill
observed by sovereign states in their mutual dealings.”223 A tribunal not
being a sovereignty state, it followed that the reference to comity was misplaced.224 The Tribunal tagged along, holding that the concept of comity
had no applicability in arbitration.225 Further, it stated that it had not
been shown that “such a legal principle is part of any known laws or rules
concerning international commercial arbitration, including Swedish or
Kazakh arbitration law.”226 It thus concluded that there was no legal basis
for it to abstain from reviewing the acts of the respondent solely because it
was a sovereign state and that comity was not, under the arbitration clause,
a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction.227
While less straightforward, the reference to comity in the Second Procedural Order in ADF can also be included under this heading.228 In the
decision, concerning the place of arbitration, the Tribunal relayed the
United States argument voicing its commitment to “facilitating international arbitration,” and considered the approach of the United States
Supreme Court on the matter.229 In particular, the Tribunal relied on the
deferential approach epitomised in Mitsubishi v Soler, which we discussed
supra, I B. 3.230
A comity argument was again raised by the respondent state in Rail220. CCL v. Kazakhstan, SCC Case No. 122/2001, 1 SIAR 123, Jurisdictional Award
(Jan. 1, 2003).
221. Id. at para. 138.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. Id.
227. See id. at para. 139.
228. See generally ADF Group Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/1,
Procedural Order No. 2 Concerning Place of Arbitration (July 1, 2001).
229. See id. at para. 9.
230. See id. at para. 14.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\50-3\CIN305.txt

606

unknown

Seq: 30

7-MAR-18

Cornell International Law Journal

12:33

Vol. 50

road Development Corporation.231 The case was about Guatemala’s use of a
legal process known as lesividad or lesivo, which serves to declare an activity harmful to the interests of the state.232 Guatemala maintained that this
process was not in itself contrary to the minimum standard of treatment.233 Finding otherwise, Guatemala argued, would in effect “undermine the requirement that fair and equitable treatment be determined by a
case-specific, fact-based inquiry, and would violate notions of comity and
sovereignty.”234 The investment arbitral tribunal dodged the issue of comity and merely found that the procedure had been abused.235
A similar argument was raised by one of the parties in Hesham T.M. Al
Warraq.236 Appearing as the Respondent, Indonesia argued that the
Claimant’s accusation that the decisions of the domestic courts had been
“unfair and unjust” amounted to “a grave charge against the independent
judiciary of one of the world’s largest democracies.”237 Accordingly, “[t]he
principle of comity alone” required the Tribunal to act on the presumption
that the Indonesian Court had acted properly.238
More recently, comity arguments were also considered by a PCA tribunal in Chevron and Texaco v. Ecuador.239 The decision on Track 1B is particularly interesting: the claimants had requested, among other things, a
declaratory award stating that the Lago Agrio Judgment “violate[d] international public policy and natural justice, and that as a matter of international comity and public policy . . . [it] should not be recognised and
enforced.”240 The Tribunal noted that “whilst not strictly bound to follow
their result or reasoning as a matter of international law, this Tribunal
would have wished to be guided, as regards any relevant issue of Ecuadorian law, by the decisions of the Lago Agrio Court, the Appellate Court of
Lago Agrio and the Cassation Court.”241 Such an approach, the Tribunal
was eager to remark, “would extend beyond courtesy, comity and due
respect for the Respondent’s judicial branch.”242 Ultimately, the Tribunal
found that the circumstances of the case— namely the multiple allegations
of denial of justice raised by the claimants— militated against the adoption
of one such approach.243
231. R.R. Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, Award,
para. 75 (June 29, 2012).
232. See id. at para. 41.
233. See id. at para. 73.
234. Id. at para. 175.
235. Id. at para. 233.
236. Hesham T.M. Al Warraq v. Republic of Indonesia, UNCITRAL, Final Award,
para. 405 (Dec. 15, 2014).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No 2009– 23, Decision on
Track 1B, para. 102 (Mar. 12, 2015).
240. Id.
241. Id. at para. 140.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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Comity and Precedent

The idea that precedents— in the non-technical meaning of “prior
cases”— of other tribunals should be followed, because of comity, was
entertained in the ICSID case Tulip Real Estate.244 The parties had referred
the Tribunal to prior decisions of various international judicial bodies.245
Here is what the Tribunal thought of it: “[a]lthough not bound by such
citations . . . as a matter of comity, it should have regard to earlier decisions of courts (particularly the ICJ) and of other international dispute
tribunals engaged in the interpretation of the terms of a [Bilateral Investment Treaty].”246
Interestingly, the Tribunal also considered issues of hierarchy: the
respondent submitted that the Tribunal accord preference to the decisions
of the International Court of Justice; the claimant maintained that ICSID
tribunal decisions were more relevant.247 The Tribunal concluded that
both sources could inform its interpretation of the terms of the BIT according to their rigour and persuasiveness.248
F.

Comity as Neighborliness, Cooperation, and Respect for Other
Sovereign Entities

In other cases, the term comity comes up as a catchall expression,
covering neighborliness and respect for the sovereign prerogatives of other
states.
In Passage Through the Great Belt, Judge Broms mentions comity in a
separate opinion, arguing that the dispute at issue could be resolved by the
use of negotiations if the parties negotiated “in the best Nordic spirit of
comity and co-operation.”249 Nordic spirits notwithstanding, it is hard to
ascribe any certain meaning, beyond the general idea of co-operation, to
this invocation of comity.
The European Court of Human Rights has, in turn, invoked the concept several times with reference to the question of the grant of sovereign
immunities in civil proceedings. The Court has addressed the issue several
times to assess whether such a grant of immunity could unduly limit one’s
right to access a court.250 Under the European Convention of Human
Rights, limitations to rights such as the one of access to a court must,
among other things, pursue a legitimate aim.251 Since 2001, the Court has
244. Tulip Real Estate Inv. & Dev. Netherlands B.V. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case
No. ARB/11/28, Decision on Bifurcated Jurisdictional Issue, paras. 45– 47 (Mar. 5,
2013).
245. Id. at para. 45.
246. Id.
247. Id. at para. 46.
248. Id. at para. 47.
249. Passage through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), Order, 1991 I.C.J. 12 (July 29).
250. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art.
6. Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005, 213 U.N.T.S. 243.
251. Id. art. 18.
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consistently argued that the grant of sovereign immunity does just that.252
It “is a concept of international law, developed out of the principle par in
parem non habet imperium, by virtue of which one State shall not be subject
to the jurisdiction of another State.”253 Its grant thus “pursues the legitimate aim of complying with international law to promote comity and good
relations between States through the respect of another State’s
sovereignty.”254
The concept was also invoked in an unclear fashion in Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.255 The issue of comity was
raised in an argument by Djibouti about a witness summons issued under
French law to the Djiboutian head of state.256 Djibouti contended that
France would have been required to take preventive measures to protect the
immunity and dignity of a head of state on its territory on an official visit
(as per Article 29 of the VCDR).257 France was thus responsible for “internationally wrongful acts consisting of infringements of the principles of
international comity and of the customary and conventional rules relating
to immunities.”258 The Court ultimately found that the defects in the summons were not unambiguously attributable to France and eluded the interpretation of the term “comity.”259
More recently, mentions of the principle in the European Court of
Human Rights case law have arguably leaned toward more qualified forms
of neighborliness; for example, in a recent case one judge has emphasized
the role of the Court in ensuring the uniform application of the 1980
Hague Convention on Child Abduction furthers comity among States.260
In yet another case it was argued that “reasons of international comity and
practicality” could have called for an effort by a state party to the Convention, which had become a source of migrants, to assist other states in the
implementation of their immigration rules and policies.261
It is arguable that the European Commission employed the term to the
same ends in one of the Kadi cases. The Court of First Instance relayed the
252. Jones and Others v. United Kingdom, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R.1; Wallishauser v. Austria, App. No. 156/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 19, 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-112194 [https://perma.cc/B9KV-3684]; Oleynikov v. Russia, App. No.
36703/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 3, 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-117124
[https://perma.cc/HNR5-TF3U]; Sabeh el Leil v. France, App. No.34869/0 (Eur. Ct.
H.R., June 29, 2011) , http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105378 [https://perma.cc/
XK7N-UTZM]; Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79; Cudak v. Lithuania, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 121; Fogarty v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 157;
McElhinney v. Ireland, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 37.
253. Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79.
254. Id.
255. Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djib. v. Fr.), Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. 177 para. 162 (June 4).
256. Id. at para. 162.
257. Id. at para. 165.
258. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 29, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T.
3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
259. Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,paras. 172– 75.
260. X v. Latvia, 2013-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 319 (Judge Albuquerque, concurring).
261. Stamose v. Bulgaria, 2012-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
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Commission’s argument that “the principle of comity of nations obliges the
Community to implement those measures (UNSC sanctions) inasmuch as
they are designed to protect all States against terrorist attacks,” but did not
discuss the remarkable claim.262
The European Court of Justice has later used the term in a different
way in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling concerning the
interpretation of a directive for the protection of workers.263 The case concerned the closure of a United States military base in the United Kingdom,
where the United States argued that the application of the directive concerned to such a strategic decision would have been incompatible with
“principles of public international law, in particular the principle of jus
imperii and that of the ‘comity of nations.”264 The Court, however, did not
decide the issue on the grounds that it did not have jurisdiction, as the
situation did not fall within the scope of the directive.265
Conclusion
This study has sought to clarify the importance, current and potential,
of the use of comity by international courts and tribunals. Our findings
support the idea that comity might be an emerging principle of procedural
law, though agreement on its exact meaning— or unequivocal choices
among its many connotations— still tends to be uncommon. We submit
that, as long as other solutions are not in place, the principle can be successfully employed to assist international courts and tribunals in mediating jurisdictional conflicts between themselves by balancing coordination
efforts and the demands of justice in the individual cases.
Comity may serve as a meta-principle of coordination between international judicial bodies, to be employed in the pursuit of the common
interest to an efficient and fair system of international dispute settlement.
There are strong reasons militating in favour of this proposition: international tribunals, by and large, possess the powers necessary to exercise it;
international judges and arbitrators know how to use it; and its long history of applications at the domestic level suggests that it can be employed
successfully for a variety of purposes.
We also submit the hunch that comity may most likely be employed as
a central principle for further aspects of the coordination of international
adjudication, for instance informing the sound use of analogical reasoning
and precedent-borrowing process. Further study will be required to assess
the potential of comity in this context. We have, so far, restricted ourselves
to a simpler and more crucial task, seeking to resituate the principle of
comity as one on which to rely for the resolution of different types of conflicts between international jurisdictions, and to question the traditional
262.
263.
264.
265.

Kadi v. Council, Case T-315/01, 2005 E.C.R. II-364.
Case C-583/10, United States v. Nolan, 1 C.M.L.R. 32 (2012).
Id. at para. 24.
Id. at para. 25.
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assumption that it is just an unhelpful complication: its history and rediscovery suggest otherwise.

